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PATENTS - THE CHANGING STANDARD OF PATENTABLE INVENTION: CONFUSION COMPOUNDED-No problem in the law of patents has caused more confusion than the standard of patentable
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invention. Lawyers and judges have struggled with this elusive
concept for more than one hundred years. While it is frequently
spoken of as a standard of invention, this is a misconception which
unduly magnifies the problem. "The inventive concept is an
abstraction impossible to define. . . . " 1 Invention and patentability are not necessarily the same. The real question is not
what is invention, but what is patentable. How great an advance
over the prior art is required to warrant patent protection? It is
a standard of patentability and not a standard of invention we
are seeking.
In section I 03 of the 1952 Patent Act, entitled "Conditions for
patentability; non-obvious subject matter," Congress attempted
to deal with the problem for the first time. 2 Although the avowed
purpose of the section was to stabilize the law,3 the attempt to
"codify" the language used in some court decisions has led to much
speculation as to the emphasis to be placed upon it. Thus the
statute has added more uncertainty to the already vague and indefinite standard of patentability. While the liberalizing influence
of the section has been stressed in legal literature,4 the courts have,
until recently, uniformly refused to recogniz~ any change in the
law.5 In Lyon v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co.,6 Judge Learned
Hand carefully analyzed the problem and took the position that
Congress intended to modify the standard then applied by the Supreme Court and revive that used twenty-five years ago. He stated
that under recent Supreme Court decisions he would be compelled
to find the patent invalid, but upheld it on the basis of his interpretation of the new statute. This comment is directed not only to
Judge Hand's interpretation, but also to the effect that his decision has ha<;l, and may be expected to have in the future, both on
the courts and Congress.
I.

Patentability Prior to 1952

In order to view the 1952 Patent Act and the resulting interpretations in their proper perspective, it is necessary to consider the
origin and evolution of the standard of patentability. In 1790
Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Dirkes, (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 24 at 27.
35 u.s.c. (1952) §103.
S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1952)
4 See Lutz, "The New Patent Statute: Congress Revitalizes the Patent System," 39
A.B.A.J. 209 (1953); Goodman, "The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952
Upon the Patent Laws," 35 J.P.O.S. 233 (1953).
5 See section III infra.
6 Lyon v. Bausch &: Lomb Optical Co., (2d 'Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 530, cert. den. 350
U.S. 911 (1955), reh. den. 350 U.S. (1956).
1
2
3
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Congress enacted the first patent statute, authorizing the issuance
of patents for new and useful inventions.7 This remained the only
statutory provision on the degree of novelty required for patentability until the 1952 act. Not until 1850 did the Supreme Court
become cognizant of the word "invention" in the statute. In H otchkiss v. Greenwood8 the Court enunciated for the first time the
principle which was to become a stumbling block for judges, lawyers, and inventors. Justice Nelson, speaking for the majority, held
a patent invalid since the advance embodied therein did not necessitate " ... more ingenuity and skill ... than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.... " 9 This phrase
became the basis of the requirement that an invention to be patentable must be more than merely new and useful.
One basic difficulty is inherent in this standard. Being subjective in nature it does not lend itself to easy or uniform application. The degree of skill attributable to an ordinary mechanic
will vary according to the knowledge and experience of the
person applying the test. For this reason several negative tests
have been developed by which the absence of patentable invention
may be determined. For example, a concept old in an analogous
art is not patentable,1° nor is an aggregation11 or a mere rearrangement of parts.12 The omission of an element with its corresponding function is not patentable invention.13 While this is not a
complete list of the tests applied, it is sufficient to illustrate
how the patent office and the courts are striving for some definite
standards to apply. Yet none of these tests are absolute.14 The
basic subjectivity remains.
In recent years there has been a growing conviction that
the Supreme Court has raised the standard of patentability.15
Judge Hand has referred to a "new doctrinal trend" which he
7 1 Stat. 109 (1790). For a brief history of prior patent legislation, see Federico,
"Commentary on the New Patent Act," 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (1954).
811 How. (52 U.S.) 248 (1850).
9 Id. at 267.
10 Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464 (1935).
11 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875).
12Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1882).
13 In re Porter, (C.C.P .A. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 971.
14 See e.g. Grever v. United States Hoffman Co., (6th Cir. 1913) 202 F. 923, where a
reversal of parts was held patentable due to the new and useful results.
15 See Cooper, "Patent Law: Challenging the Court's View of Invention," 35 A.B.A.J.
306 (1949); Dodds & Crotty, "The New Doctrinal Trend,'' 30 J.P.O.S. 83 (1948); Lutz,
"The Constitution v. The Supreme Court Re: Patents For Inventions,'' 13 UNIV. Prrr. L.
REv. 449 (1952); Contra, Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases on the
Question of Patentable Invention," 44 Iu.. L. REv. 41 (1949).
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was bound to follow.16 A substantial number of courts of appeals
have concurred.17 Some support is lent this view by the high
mortality rate of patents which come before the courts. A recent
Patent Office survey of published decisions indicates that between 1925 and 1929 37.7 percent of patents before the courts
of appeals were held valid and infringed, while only 33.4 percent
were held invalid. In contrast only 18.2 percent were held valid
and infringed between 1950 and 1954, while 60. 7 percent were
held invalid.18 Too much reliance should not be placed on these
statistics to show a change in the standard of patentability.
Several other explanations may demonstrate why patents fare
less well today than twenty-five years ago. It has been suggested
that the lower courts are misinterpreting Supreme Court decisions.19 Some feel that the skill of a mechanic has increased
in this technological age. 20 A third suggestion is that the Supreme
Court, distrusting patents and the policy behind them, is applying the classic tests, but with greater severity.21 These divergent
views illustrate the dual nature of the problem. One is the
determination of the standard of patentability in law. The
second is the application of the standard to the facts of a particular
case. Although they are not entirely independent, a clear understanding of the existence of both is helpful in determining the
proper context for the 1952 Patent Act.
16 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp.,
17 Alemite Co. v. Jiffy Lubricator

(2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636.
Co., (8th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 444, cert. den.
339 U.S. 912 (1950), reh. den. 339 U.S. 939 (1950); Trabon Engineering Co. v. Dirkes,
(6th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 24; Jeoffroy Mfg. v. Graham, (5th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d)
772 (1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 920 (1954), reh. den. 347 U.S. 940 (1954); Associated
Folding Box Co. v. Levkoff, (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 252; Contra, Barie v. Superior
Tanning Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 724; In re Shortell, (C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d)
292. For review of authorities see Balluff, "Do Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise
the Standard of Invention, and are Lower Courts Misinterpreting Such Opinions?" 34
J.P.O.S. 847 (1952).
18 S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent System, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 182 (1955). Since the Supreme Court hears few patent cases this writer believes that
those statistics are inconclusive for comparative purposes. But see Frost, "The Patent
System and the Modern Economy," Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 59 (1956), where the statistics of cases heard by the Supreme Court were used to show
that it is at least arguable that the decisions today are no less favorable than those
rendered earlier.
19 Balluff, "Do Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise the Standard of Invention
and Are Lower Courts Misinterpreting Such Opinions?" 34 J.P.O.S. 847 (1952).
20 Brown &: Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., (1st Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 48
at 52, cert. den. 328 U.S. 869 (1946).
21 Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases on the Question of Patentable Invention," 44 ILL. L. REv. 41 (1949). See also Justice Jackson's dissent in Jungersen
v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 571 (1949).
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The Supreme Court has never expressly raised the standard of
patentability. Nor do its opinions indicate an intention to raise
the standard as such. In Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,22
the case most frequently cited as adopting a new and higher
standard, the court relied on the older authorities, referring
specifically to the "mechanical skill" test of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.23 To be sure the court did use the now famous term, "flash
of creative genius." However, that idea appeared in the cases as
early as 1880 and there is no indication that the Court in the
Cuno case thought it was introducing a new concept.24 The
phrase has not appeared in subsequent Supreme Court opinions
and the lower courts have refused to give it a literal interpretation.25 The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp.26 decision is also cited frequently for the proposition that the standard of patentability has been raised. Yet it
should be emphasized that it is the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas which has caused the most concern. The opinion of the
Court, written by Justice Jackson, who previously had decried
the indiscriminate invalidation of patents,27 does not evince an
intention to raise the standard.
On the other hand, there are indications that, while no formal
change has been made in the standard applied by the Supreme
Court, it is being applied with greater severity. In the past ten
years the Supreme Court has held valid and infringed only two
of the fifteen patents which came before it.28 The fact that the
Supreme Court grants certiorari in so few cases refutes the theory
that the lower courts are applying a higher standard than would
the Court. Additional support for this view is evidenced by the
fact that not since 1935 has the Supreme Court reversed a finding
of invalidity.29
22 314 U.S.
23 11 How.

84 (1941).
(52 U.S.) 248 (1950).
24 See Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U.S. 375 at 378 (1880), where the court used term
"flash of thought."
25 Brown &: Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., (1st Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 48,
cert. den. 328 U.S. 869 (1946).
26 340 U.S. 147 (1950), reh. den. 340 U.S. 918 (1951).
27 Jungersen v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949), reh. den. 336 U.S. 915 (1949),
reh. den. 336 U.S. 931 (1949), Justice Jackson dissenting at 571.
28 Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949), reh. den. 338 U.S. 896 (1949); Graver Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949), affd. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). In the latter only some
of the disputed claims were held valid. See S. Hearing before Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent
System, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 183 (1955).
29 The last reversal which this writer has been able to find after a diligent search is
Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. I (1935), reh. den. 294 U.S. 732 (1935).
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The language in patent opinions, while not changing the
technical standard, does indicate an attitude opposed to basic
tenets of the patent system.80 This attitude is based on two
principal factors. First, some feel that a patent, being in the
nature of a monopoly, is fundamentally opposed to the spirit of
the antitrust laws and our free enterprise system.81 This group
believes that the public benefits every time a patent is held invalid. Such a belief, however, results from a misconception of
the operation of the patent system.82 The second factor is a fear
that patent rights are frequently abused and is a result of failure
to distinguish the proper scope of the patent from such abuses.
The extent of this fear and confusion is illustrated by Russell v.
Comfort,33 where relief for infringement was denied although the
facts show no relationship between the abuse and the patent. It
was this judicial attitude which confronted Congress when it
included section 103 in the I 952 Patent Act.
II.

The 1952 Patent Act

The express purpose of the 1952 Patent Act was "to revise
and codify the laws relating to patents. . . ." 34 The· use of those
two words raises the question as to what parts are revisions and
what parts are codification. In section I 02 Congress restated the
law of novelty. Section 103, however, is new to our statutory law
and reads as follows: 35
·
"A patent may not be obtained though the invention
30 See Justice Douglas' dissent in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 380
(1945); Justice Douglas concurring in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 154 (1950).
81 See Hamilton and Till, "What is a Patent?" 13 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 245 (1948);
Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 31 (1941). But see
Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L: R.Ev. 199 (1955);
"Antitrust Problems in the Exploitation of Patents," Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5
of the Committee on the Judiciary of tlle House of Representatives, 84tll Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 25 (1957).
82 But see Frost, "The Patent System and tlle Modem Economy," Study No. 2 of
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of tlle Committee on tlle
Judiciary of tlle Senate, 84tll Cong., 2d sess., p. 60 (1956), where it is urged tliat a
finding of invalidity results in a disservice to the public in tllat a decision for validity
induces desirable research. See also Bush, "Proposals for Improving tlle Patent System,"
Study No. 1 of tlle Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of tlle Committee on tlle Judiciary of the Senate, 84tll Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1956).
83 F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 592.
See REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMI'ITEE ·TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 251 (1955).
34 S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 1 (1952); H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 1 (1952).
85 35 u.s.c. (1952) §103.
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is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section I 02 of this title if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made."
The second sentence of this section clearly abolishes any remnant
of the "flash of genius" test, if it ever existed. There is no confusion
on this point.36 But what did Congress intend to achieve by the
first sentence of the section? Research in the legislative history of
the act leads to conflicting conclusions. Speaking of the entire
act, the House Report refers to "minor procedural and other
changes deemed substantially noncontroversial and desirable.''37
While it may be said that a change in the standard of patentable
invention is desirable, nevertheless it certainly cannot be called
uncontroversial. In contrast, the same report also speaks of section 103 as one of the "major changes or innovations."38
The terminology of section 103 is that used in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood,89 which has been a part of the common law of patents
for more than one hundred years. The congressional reports
recognize this fact:
"That provision paraphrases language which has often been
used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to
the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section
should have a stabilizing effect and minimize the great departures which have_ appeared in some cases."40
Any attempt to analyze this section as either codification or
revision seems futile. Congress realized it was stating old law
in statutory form, but did so with a definite purpose in mind,
viz., to stabilize the law. It is submitted that Congress recognized
that judicial animosity toward patents had resulted in a more
strict application of the old standard in many cases. It was hoped
that a congressional declaration of the standard could prevent
36 Pacific Contact Laboratories v. Solex Laboratories, (9th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d)
529, cert. den. 348 U.S. 816 (1954); Gagnier Fibre Products Co. v. Fourslides, Inc., (E.D.
Mich. 1953) 112 F. Supp 926.
37 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 3 (1952).
38 Id. at 5.
39 Note 8 supra.
40 S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 6 (1952); H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 7 (1952).
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the departures arising from this harsh application without any
change in the basic standard. This interpretation is reinforced
by the enactment for the first time of two other common law
concepts which had fallen prey to the stern judicial attitude,
the presumption of validity and the right of action for contributory
infringment.41

III.

Judicial Attitude Prior to Bausch &
Lomb Decision

Although it is interesting and illuminating to search for
legislative intent, judicial interpretation is the final determinant
of the effect of the statute. Prior to the Bausch & Lomb42 decision the courts uniformly referred to section I 03 as a codification.43 It is questionable, however, whether much weight should
be given to these decisions. The two decisions most frequently
cited for the proposition that section I 03 is merely a codification
of existing law are Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.44 and
General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.45 Both cases contain
such statements, but they are mere dicta, for, although the courts
did attempt to discover the intent of Congress, the act was expressly found inapplicable in both instances. In Wasserman v.
Burgess & Blacher Co.,46 another case which apparently ruled
section 103 to be a codification, relied solely on the two previous
decisions and gave no independent consideration to the problem.
The patent involved in Pacific Contact Laboratories v. Solex
Laboratories47 was held valid and infringed, making that decision
authority only for the fact that the standard had not been raised.
In New Wrinkle v. Watson 48 the court found a lack of patentable
invention under any view of the criteria established by the new
act.
Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Products Co.49 is another case where
the court expressly found the Patent Act inapplicable. Yet although the court believed the act was essentially a codification,
41 35 u.s.c.

(1952) §§281, 271.
Note 6 supra.
43 Judge Hand recognized this fact but found no case holding that §103 did not
change the standard of invention.
44 (3d Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 846, cerL den. 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
45 (6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 912, cert. den. 346 U.S. 822 (1953).
46 (1st Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 402.
47 (9th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 529, cert. den. 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
48 (D.C. Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 421, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
49 (5th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 305, cert. den. 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
42
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it also recognized the need for uniformity in lower court decisions.
It further referred to the codification of a "better" view on patentability. This again illustrates the weakness in attemping to solve
the problem by calling the act a codification or a revision. Some
circuits have been more favorable toward patents than others.
The Fifth Circuit, which decided the Suni-Citrus case, is one of
those which has been favorable to patents.50 The degree of change
wrought by section 103 must be determined with respect to these
pre-existing views. For this reason neither Interstate Rubber
Products Co. v. Radiator Specialty Co.51 nor Application of
O'Keefe52 can be considered strong authority for the proposition
that section 103 contemplates no change in patentability. The
latter case was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals which has never recognized the "new doctrinal trend." 53
In the Interstate decision the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit speaks of codification of a standard that has been used
for one hundred years. In view of the favorable attitude of that
court toward patents it is probably true that no change was intended with respect to their former decisions, which have been
fairly consistent for that period.54
Thus it may safely be said that prior to 1955, although all indications were that the 1952 Patent Act would be interpreted as making
no change in the standard of patentability to be applied by the
courts, there was no direct court of appeals decision so holding.

IV. Effect of Bausch & Lomb Decision
Judge Learned Hand's decision in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb
Co.55 was the first judicial recognition that Congress intended to
restore the classical tests of patentability from which the courts
had departed to some extent in the preceding twenty-five years.
While this writer believes it more likely that Congress intended
only to eliminate the influence of the intangible judicial attitude
opposed to patents which had caused a harsh application of the
50 See S. Hearings before Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of
the Committee on the Judiciary on the American Patent System, 84th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 178 (1955). For the period from 1948 to 1954, a review of percentage of patents held
valid and infringed showed the following: 4th Cir., 37%; 5th Cir., 36.7%; 9th Cir., 24.5%;
10th Cir., 21.9%; 7th Cir., 19.0%; 6th Cir., 15.4%; 1st Cir., 11.5%; 8th Cir., 8.4%; 3d Cir.,
7.5%; 2d Cir., 2.6%.
51 (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 546.
52 (C.C.P.A. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 767.
53 In re Shortell, (C.C.P .A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292.
54 See note 50 supra.
55 Note 6 supra.
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old standards, this decision nevertheless restores the promise
originally seen in section 103.56 It remains to be seen whether
this decision will have any persuasive effect on other courts.
Although the opinion has received great notoriety, it is too
early to determine its fate. 57 The "somewhat more lenient
standard" seems to have run into difficulty in the Second Circuit
where it originated. Three recent cases have held patents invalid
while ostensibly, though somewhat reluctantly, applying that
standard.58 In a fourth case, Judge Frank, who wrote the opinion,
stated that he had serious doubts about the correctness of the
ruling. 59 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had an
opportunity to reexamine its dicta in General Motors Corp. v.
Estate Stove Co.,60 but reaffirmed its earlier position without considering Judge Hand's decision. 61 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
has ignored the decision in finding nothing novel in section 103.62
On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit, referring
to Bausch & Lomb, stated that it could " ... safely assume that
the Patent Act of 1952 was intended to restore 'the law to what it
was when the court announced the definition of invention.' " 63
The Tenth Circuit, although not referring to the Bausch & Lomb
decision, indicated a similar feeling when it said, "It may well
be that the Congress intended to roll back the philosophical
standards of patentabili:ty typified by Cuno Engineering Corp.
v. Automatic Devices Corp., ... and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co...." 64
At present the decision appears to have had its most pronounced
effect in the Third Circuit. Prior to Judge Hand's decision,
that court in dicta had considered section I 03 a codification,
causing no change in the standard of patentability. 65 In R. M.
56 See Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L. REv.
199 at 205 (1955).
57 See 55 CoL. L. REv. 1231 (1955), 44 Gp,. L.J. 100 (1955), 1956 Wrs. L. REv. 513.
:;s Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 280; Gentzel v.
Manning, Maxwell &: Moore, Inc., (2d Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 352 U.S. 840
(1956); Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Sunware Products Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 225.
59 Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F.
(2d) 9 at 11, n. 3.
60 Note 45 supra.
61 Bobertz v. General Motors Corp., (6th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 94, cert. den. 352 U.S.
824 (1956).
62 Helms Products v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 677.
6SL-O-F Glass Fibers Co. v. Watson, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 40 at 47, n. 14.
64 Blish, Mize and Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., (10th Cir. 1956)
236 F. (2d) 913 at 915.
65 Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., note 44 supra.
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Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc. 66 the court has at least modified its
position, if not reversed it. The court felt th~t in view of the
statements that the act was a codification, declarations that it
"changed" the law were "perhaps" too strong. Nevertheless,
Judge Kalodner, speaking for the majority of the full court,
felt inclined to accept Judge Hand's observations that there
was a judicial tendency to expect an indefinite "more" within the old standards. He realized that the extent of the
change wrought by section 103 depended upon the court's pre-·
existing view on patentability, but did not indicate how this
affected that court's prior views.67 He was impressed by the
congressional desire to stabilize the law and the inclusion of the
presumption of validity in the statute. It appeared to him
that the presumption was intended to achieve the stabilizing
effect. Whether the case should be limited to a strengthening of the presumption of validity or whether it also indicates some relaxation of the courts' harsh views on patentability is still in doubt. 68
V.

The Future

The only statement that can be made with unquestioned accuracy about the standard of patentable invention is that it presents one of the most difficult problems in the law. Being subjective in nature it requires some value judgments and presents
wide opportunities for variance. Prior to 1952 many courts indicated an attitude opposed to the basic philosophy of the patent
system, which expressed itself in a harsh application of the
standard of patentable invention. Congress was aware of this
fact when it enacted the 1952 Patent Act and attempted to alleviate
the problem and stabilize the law by including section 103 which
codified language used in some prior cases. Until 1955 it appeared that the hope foreshadowed by the act would be extinguished by misconceived judicial interpretation. While the
Bausch & Lomb decision and those which follow it again renew
this hope, they do not represent an elixir. Taken literally they
merely refer one to prior judicial statements defining a vague and
66 (3d
67 See

Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 496.
note 50 supra. It would appear that this court previously entertained a very
harsh attitude toward patents.
68 In Newburg Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., (3d Cir. 1956) 111 U.S.P.Q. 126,
it was cited as stating a standard of patentability. It is not clear, however, what standard
was set.
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indefinite standard.69 They do not eliminate the uncertainty
of the standard or prevent judicial determinations based on an
individual judge's philosophy toward the patent system.
Congress again has indicated an awareness of the problem.
In 1955 the O'Mahoney Subcommtttee of the Senate70 began
a study of the patent laws and their operation. One of the principal
concerns of that study has been the standard of patentability.
The committee has expressed concern bver the problem of the
great divergence between an issued patent and a val~d patent.71
Two principal types of solutions have been suggested. The first
would eliminate the inventive concept as a prerequisite to patentability and establish a recording system similar to the copyright
law.72 The second would replace the subjective test of patentability with an objective test. 73 Neither approach has been generally
accepted, the former because it misplaces the emphasis of the
patent system and the latter because it introduces too much
rigidity into the system.74 Yet, while there is a desire to keep
flexibility in the standard of patentability, there is also a demand
in some quarters for "freshly defined criteria of invention."75
What the ultimate result~ of the O'Mahoney Subcommittee's
study will be is not certain. Several private research studies for that
subcommittee are still in preparation.76 It is clear, however, that
the subcommittee stands behind the basic philosophy of the patent
system. It is this writer's belief that the basic problem lies not in
69 St,e Smith, "Recent Developments in Patent Law," 44 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1946),
for exposition of the view that the "new doctrinal trend" was but a reversion to stricter
standards of an earlier period.
70 The Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate.
71 See S. Rep. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 4 (1956); S. Rep. 72, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 8 (1957).
12 See testimony of Judge Learned Hand, S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 114 (1955).
73 See, e.g., the "new functional relationship" test suggested by G. Wright Arnold,
S. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 47, 48 (1955).
74 See Frost, "The Patent System and the Modern Economy," Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 2d sess., pp. 54, 55 (1957).
·
75 See Bush, "Proposals for Improving the Patent System," Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 15 (1956). Nevertheless, the author still speaks in terms
of obviousness. Compare with Frost, "The Patent System and the Modern Economy,
Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 56 (1957), where the "skill of the
art" test is termed the only adequate general measure of invention.
76 See S. Rep. 72, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 22 to 29 (1957).
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the standard of patentable invention but in this philosophy toward patents and the patent system. If the problem is going to be
solved, it will not be by a statutory definition of invention, but by
a thorough understanding of the operation of the patent system and
a realization by those who apply the laws that the patent laws are
not inconsistent with the antitrust laws and that there are independent realms of protection granted by each. 77 In this respect
the congressional study may lead to a clarification of the confused
standard of patentable invention.
John M. Webb, S.Ed.

77 See Oppenheim, "Patents and Antitrust-Peaceful Coexistence?" 54 MICH. L. R.Ev.
199 (1955).

